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Private rights and Public goods: conflicts in agriculture R&D  
 
Introduction  
 
The last two decades have seen the private sector play an increasing role in 
agricultural R&D. There has equally been an increase in the number of collaborative 
initiatives between the public and private sectors in this field some of which have 
intellectual property implications. The public sector is awakening to the idea of using 
IP which has partially been accelerated by its interaction with the private sector, 
particularly in developing countries. This paper will explore the link firstly, between 
public agriculture research institutes and the provision of public goods (food and 
agriculture); and secondly, the implications of implementing IP on the provision of 
the said goods by the public sector. The focus will be on developing countries. 
 
The first tier of the enquiry will examine the nature of public goods, and whether their 
characteristics dictate which sector (private or private) is best suited for their 
provision. The second section will inquire into the effect of applying IP in the 
provision of public goods by the public sector. This will specifically dwell on the 
agricultural sector and will look at the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) as the largest public investor in agricultural R&D in 
developing countries. The main question this section will attempt to answer is 
whether the application of IP conflicts with the institutions’ mandates to provide 
public goods and the challenges faced by public research organisations in the 
application of IP.  
 
I public research institutes and the provision of public goods  
 
The main line of inquiry in this part is whether the characteristics of a good determine 
what sector is best suited to provide the said good. It will necessarily begin with the 
examination of the nature of public and private goods. The ultimate goal is to 
determine whether the public sector is the generally most suited sector to provide 
public goods and if so, what happens when the exception pertains.  
 
Definitions 
 
The debate on classification of goods can be traced back to Samuelson1 and 
Musgrave.2 Samuelson used the “jointness of consumption” as the main attribute to 
divide all goods into two classes: private consumption goods and public consumption 
goods. According to Samuelson, “collective consumption goods” are those goods  
 
‘… which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual’s 
consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other 
individual’s consumption of that good…’3 
Jointness of consumption is also referred to as non rivalry, nonrivalry of consumption 
or indivisibility of benefits. Some authors do indeed use the terms interchangeably.4 
                                                 
1 Paul Samuelson, 'The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure', The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
36/4 (1954), 387-89.  
2 R. A.  Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959). 
3 Samuelson supra note 1 at p. 387 
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Musgrave on the other hand argued that a different attribute – whether someone can 
be excluded from benefiting once the good is produced (excludability) – was more 
important that Samuelson’s rivalness attribute. Both aimed to show when market 
forces would perform optimally in the provision of specific classification of goods 
and when markets would fail. 5 
 
Public goods are contrasted to private goods which are said to be rivalrous and 
excludable. Because few goods fall neatly into these two categories, other categories 
such as impure public goods and common pool resource are now recognised in 
addition to the two classical groups. Drahos underscores this by stating that ‘a public 
good is not a single good, but an effect with complex antecedents made up of a set of 
complementary goods (private and public) and different types of social actors.’6 
Generally, these two criteria are used to distinguish pure public goods from private 
goods. 
 
Pure public goods are therefore non-rivalrous and non-excludable so as to be 
accessible to growing numbers of people without any marginal cost. This quality – 
wide dispersion of benefits – renders them unsuitable for private entrepreneurship. 
Pure public goods are thus best provided for by the state.  
 
Examples of pure public goods have been dwindling since the critique of the classical 
examples of the light house and of national defence. It is now widely acknowledged 
that goods rarely fall neatly within the above criteria hence the recognition of club 
goods and common pool resources.7 According to Samuelson, rivalrous goods, 
whether excludable or not could be efficiently provided through market mechanisms 
while Musgrave, arguing that excludability was the determining factor, contended that 
market mechanisms are preferable for those goods that are excludable whether 
rivalrous or not. Similarly, Cornes & Sandler argue that nonexcludability is the crucial 
factor in determining which goods must be provided by the public sector.  
 
The difficulty at assigning goods along the rivalry – excludability spectrum impacts 
on policy decisions on the provision of goods. Samuelson himself conceded that many 
goods commonly termed as public goods do not fit within his definition;8 a significant 
amount of literature has been generated since some of which attempts to clarify and 
develop models relating to ‘mixed goods’ – those that lie somewhere between the 
extremes of pure private and pure public goods.9 
                                                                                                                                            
4  Richard Cornes and Todd Sandler, The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods and Club Goods (2nd 
edn.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). use nonrivalry of consumption  and indivisibility of 
benefits interchangeably. 
5 “The classification debate was a major policy concern over the role of government in allocating 
resources.” See Elinor Ostrom, 'How Types of Goods and Property Rights Jointly Affect Collective 
Action', Journal of Theoretical Politics, 13/3 (2003), 239-70.  
6 Peter Drahos, 'The Regulation of Public Goods', in Keith Maskus and Jerome Reichman (eds.), 
International Public Goods and Transfer of Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property 
Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
7 See Cornes & Sandler supra note 4 on club goods – those which are excludable but non-rival; 
common pool resources are rivalrous but non excludable.  
8 Paul Samuelson, 'A Diagramatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure', Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 37 (1955), 350-56. 
9 An example is S Holtermann, 'Externalities and Public Goods', Economica, 39/153 (1972), 78-87. 
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Indeed some public goods appear to have a mixture of private goods and public goods 
characteristics. Examples can be found in education, health, agriculture and the justice 
system where these are not consumed in equal amounts by everyone and one person’s 
consumption decreases the amount available for other people to consume. 
Holtermann10 distinguishes between a public good’s provision and utilisation in that a 
public good’s provision may be public in so far as it is equally available for 
everyone’s consumption but its utilisation may contain aspects of private goods in that 
utilisation is different for different individuals and an increase in one person’s 
utilisation decreases the amount available to others. Similarly, Pickhardt observes that 
most goods which give rise to private benefits also involve externalities in varying 
degrees thereby combining both public and private good characteristics.11 
 
In determining if a good is a pure public good or a mixed good, Holtermann maintains 
that this will depend on whether an individual consumption unit can be defined and 
secondly, whether consumption is in the control of the consumer, at least in principle. 
He however concedes that the dividing line is not clear. Vaknin12 advances the 
argument further by asserting that technology plays a part in blurring the distinction 
between public and private goods.  Given that the world is finite, resources in it are 
finite too and the economic concept of scarcity applies ubiquitously so that public 
goods are not exempt. Strict non rivalry is therefore not possible.13 
 
The foregoing highlights the difficulty in clearly demarcating goods into pure public 
and private goods. Most goods lie in the public goods private goods continuum.  
 
Agriculture and public goods 
 
Gardner and Lesser14 argue that agricultural research does not produce pure public 
goods but “impure public goods” as some users cannot be excluded or charged for 
some uses of the goods produces. Agriculture is no doubt a mixed good in that it 
contains both elements of public and private goods. The end product of agriculture – 
food- is a private good in so far as it is both rivalrous (once consumed, it no longer 
exists) and excludable (its owner can exclude others from consuming it). The land on 
which food is grown is likewise a private good. However, the technology and 
knowledge required in growing agronomically appropriate crops of high quality and 
yield is non-rivalrous. Further, the benefits of a healthy well fed nation impact on 
society as a whole. As such, government involvement in the provision of this mixed 
good is vital in order to ensure the overall positive social effect. This is particularly 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Michael Pickhardt, 'Fifty Years after Samuelson's "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure": What 
Are We Left With?' 58th Congress of the International Institute of Public Finace (IIPF) (Helsinki, 
2002). 
12 Sam Vaknin, 'Is Education a Public Good?' (2003). 
13 As observed by Musgrave supra note 2 and in R. A. Musgrave, 'Provision for Social Goods', in 
Margolis J and Guitton H (eds.), Public Economics (London: McMillan, 1969). 
14 Bruce Gardner and William Lesser, 'International Agricultural Research as a Global Public Good', 
Amer. J. Agr. Econ., 85/3 (2003), 692-97. 
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important in the present time given the growing disparity in wealth allocation 
exacerbated by changes brought about by globalisation.15   
 
IPRs and the correction of market failure 
 
In an ideal market, the price of each good should be equal to the cost borne by society 
in consuming it. If goods are produced above marginal cost, they will be under-
consumed; if they are provided at marginal cost (free) they will tend to be under-
produced as they will be no incentive to invest in their production. Pure public goods 
represent the second scenario. Different mechanisms are used to correct this market 
failure; IPRs and government intervention are but two ways.  
 
IPRs alter the nature of technology from public to private by introducing excludability 
although not rivalry.16 The downside is that the application of IPRs can result in 
under-consumption such as when IPRs result in vital drugs being prohibitively 
expensive so as to be out of reach of poor people. Barder distinguishes between the 
application of IPRs to rival goods from their application to non-rival goods.17 He 
posits that when a good’s consumption is rival, imposition of property rights helps to 
improve the use of scarce resources but argues that when applied to non-rival goods 
(such as knowledge), IPRs move society away from an optimum allocation of 
resources.  
 
Barder explores different ways of rewarding creators of knowledge observing that the 
different ways have different distributional implications, different welfare impacts and 
influence nature of R&D differently. IPRs may lead to the pricing of important 
welfare goods e.g. crops protected by plant variety rights out of poor people’s reach. 
The infamous “golden rice” where extensive patenting hampered delivery of rice to 
those in need is a case in point.18 Application of IPRs may also distort research 
priorities such as when private companies choose to invest in commercial crops and 
neglect pro-poor orphan crops.19 This is especially important given that six companies 
hold 75percent of all agricultural patents20 increasing the risk of non-delivery of 
agricultural inventions to the poor. 
 
Even Adam Smith, the most ardent advocate of laissez-faire, recognised the need for 
government intervention in some select areas. Government intervention in areas such 
as health, education and agriculture is needed to reverse market failure, reduce 
transaction costs so as to enhance consumption or supply and hence positive 
externalities. Government intervention is needed to redirect research according to 
                                                 
15 Alex Duncan, 'Agricultural Research, Globalisation and Global Public Goods', Rural Forum,  (2002). 
discusses  agriculture research and the provision of global public goods from a globalisation 
perspective. 
16 Vaknin supra note 12 at p3 argues that technology converts some public goods into private goods 
and vice versa; “education used to be a private good with positive externalities. Thanks to technology 
and government largesse it is no longer the case. It is being transformed into a non pure public good.” 
17 Most of the following part is drawn from Owen Barder, 'Intellectual Property and Market Failure', 
(2003). 
18 Rafi, 'Golden Rice and Trojan Trade Reps: A Case Study in the Public Sector’s Mismanagement of 
Intellectual Property', (2000). 
19 In the health industry, it is reported that drug companies spend ten times more researching cures for 
baldness and obesity than they do on cures for malaria. 
20 Ronald Phillips et al., 'Intellectual Property Rights and the Public Good', The Scientist, 18/14 (2004). 
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social value so as to promote creation of knowledge in areas with highest social return 
rather than according to the highest opportunity for rent extraction. This is particularly 
important given that the distributional impact of IP, social welfare costs and distortion 
of R&D are greater now than ever before. Research into problems affecting the poor 
is increasing marginalised over the development of IP for which rich consumers are 
willing to pay.  
 
 
II The implications of applying IP in the provision of public goods 
 
It has been asserted that IP law is modelled on private gains and is therefore more 
compatible with private sector research.21 The interface between application of IPRs 
in the provision of public goods has been briefly discussed in the preceding section.  
This section is an enquiry on the challenges encountered by agricultural public 
research organisations in the application of IPRs. The Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) is the largest public investor in 
agriculture R&D in developing countries and will therefore be the subject in this 
section. The main task will be an analysis of IP policies in the CGIAR to elucidate the 
underlying principles guiding the application of IP in public agricultural research 
organisations.  
 
IPRs and public goods 
 
As earlier seen, IPRs introduce excludability into pure public goods. IPRs can be said 
to reverse Holtermann’s classification thus:  
 
Holtermann: 
Pure Public goods  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IPRs reverse this: 
Pure Public goods to 
which IPRs are 
applied  
 
 
 
 
 
The main end objective of public research organisations is presumed to be the 
provision of research products for the general public. Most organisations will 
                                                 
21 John Mugabe, 'Intellectual Property Protection and Traditional Knowledge: An Exploration of 
International Policy Discourse', (WIPO, 1998). 
Provision utilisation
Public CCCs Private CCCs
Equally available to all 
Different for different people – one 
person’s consumption reduces the 
amount available for others
Provision  
Private CCCs
utilisation
Public CCCs
Not equally accessible 
(available but not 
accessible to all) 
Non-rivalrous – one person’s 
consumption does not subtract 
from others’ consumption
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particularly focus on the marginalized sections of the public. The assumption is that 
the products of their research are equally available and accessible to everyone.  
 
In theory therefore, there is an innate conflict in the application of IPRs to the 
provision of public goods. How does a public research organisation apply IPRs 
(which introduce excludability) while still maintaining their mandate to provide goods 
equally available and accessible to all? This inherent theoretical conflict has been the 
subject of many a debate and requires careful and creative formulation of policy to 
ensure balancing these conflicting interests.  
 
Having established that there is an inherent conflict (at least in theory) of the 
application of IPRs to the provision of public goods, it has to be asked why public 
research organisations are faced with this dilemma. Why apply IPRs at all?  
 
Why/when do public research organisations apply IPRs? 
 
The past decade has seen a constant decline in funds allocated for research in 
agriculture. In the face of many competing claims on donor aid, international 
agricultural research no longer commands priority in funding.22 In the backdrop of the 
environment that International Agriculture Research Centres (IARCs) find themselves 
having to operate in is the increasing privatisation and globalisation of R&D and the 
growing assertion of ownership of agricultural resources through the application of 
IPRs by both the private and the public sectors. 
 
The changing agricultural R&D scene has raised vital issues which IARCs and other 
public research organisations have to address. Not the least of these is the question of 
whether income generation is consistent with the wider mandate of public research 
organisations to serve the needs of the poor farmers and maximise benefits to society 
as a whole.23 Public research organisations have to find means to balance the need for 
income generation and that of the delivery of public goods.  
 
The advent of the IP regime has had a significant impact on the CGIAR. One of the 
ways in which this has occurred relate to the temptation to seek IP protection for CG 
germplasm by third parties. A number of high- profile cases occurring in the late 90s 
bear evidence to this.24 Research by the Action group on Erosion, Technology and 
Concentration (the ETC group, then known as the Rural Advancement Foundation 
International, RAFI) indicates that there could be more cases of this nature.25 In 
                                                 
22 Michael Blakeney, 'Agricultural Research: Intellectual Property and the Cgiar System', in Peter 
Drahos and Mayne Ruth (eds.), Global Intellectual Property Rights: Knowledge, Access and 
Development (Hampshire: Pelgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
23 See K  Fischer and D Byerlee, 'Managing Intellectual Property and Income Generation in Public 
Research Organisations ', in D Byerlee and R Echeverria (eds.), Agricultural Research Policy in an Era 
of Privatisation (Oxon: CABI Publishing, 2002). for a more thorough discussion of issues such as how 
the public sector can provide free flow of genetic resources to maintain diversity of sustainable 
systems; what the balance should be in public research between commercialisation of its products and 
serving the needs of poor farmers; how the public sector can gain access to proprietary tools and 
technologies to serve the poor; and when it should take out IPRs on its own products. 
24 In 1998, PBR applications were made in Australia for accessions obtained from ICARDA and 
ICRISAT, see R  Edwards and I Anderson, 'Seeds of Wrath', New Scientist 14/2121 (14 February 
1998).    
25 See the then RAFI press release, 1998 at http://www.biotech-info.net/moratorium.html  
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developing countries, it is likely that such abuse of CG germplasm could be carried 
out not only by the private sector in the form of the numerous small seed companies, 
but also by partners in National Agriculture Research Institutes (NARIs) in spite of 
the MTAs.26  
 
The past two decades have seen an increase in private sector involvement in 
agriculture R&D particularly since the inception of agriculture biotechnology. This, in 
addition to the mandatory global IP regime have contributed to a rapidly changing 
IPR environment to which the CG Centres have to continually adapt.  
 
Protecting technology has in some cases attracted the involvement of the private 
sector. In some of the collaborations with the private sector, the probability of 
developing proprietary technology with significant commercial implications cannot be 
ruled out as an important lure for the private sector. In other cases, private seed 
companies, recognising the competitively high quality of Centre bred material, have 
been reluctant to distribute seed from Centres unless they can do so exclusively.   
 
Dealings with the private sector have heightened the need for public research 
institutions to be IP savvy not in the least because of the danger of infringing IP 
belonging to a third party.27   
 
These are only a snapshot of the challenges that CG Centres have to address in the 
context of commercialisation and protection of its products.   
 
Are there alternatives to using IPRs to address these problems? 
 
With regard to income generation, although the sale of IP protected research products 
can be beneficial in funding research costs, there is little formal analysis of the 
significance of the gains from using IP protection as a strategy for generating new 
revenues for research.28 IARCs and other public research organisations can employ a 
number of ways to generate income to offset their budget deficit. Sale of non-research 
products and services such as soil and chemical testing, diagnostic tests, sale of 
commercial seed and vaccines and staff consultancies29 are income generating 
activities that are generally within the mandate of public research organisations.  
 
In biotechnology inventions, IARCs and other public research organisations can opt 
for defensive publishing in order to keep an invention in the public domain. Other 
                                                 
26 The CG 1998 Mid Term Meeting agreed on the procedure Centres should follow if violation of an 
MTA occurs. This starts with a request of an explanation from the germplasm recipient and where this 
is not satisfactory, a notification that a violation has occurred and a ‘cease and desist’ request. The 
Centres should also notify the regulatory authority in the relevant country that an MTA has been 
violated and that the granting of IPR should be void. The Centre should also notify the FAO 
Commission on Genetic Resources 
27 See R Wolson, 'Intellectual Property Tools, Innovation and Commercialisation of R&D: Options to 
Assist Developing Countries in Positioning Themselves to Reap the Benefits of a Stronger Intellectual 
Property Regime, with Special Reference to the Role of Intellectual Property Management in Research 
Organisations', ICTSD/UNCTAD/TIPS Regional Dialogue on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation 
and Sustainable Development in Eastern and Southern Africa (Cape Town, South Africa, 2004). 
28 M Maredia, ' Application of Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries: Implications for 
Public Policy and Agricultural Research Institutes', (Geneva: WIPO, 2001). 
29 Ibid. 
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non-IPR protection strategies include biological protection through hybridisation, 
conventional seed law through certification and use of contracts such as the ever-
popular MTAs.30  
 
The preceding concedes that there are occasions where public research organisations 
have to apply or at least deal with IPRs. Clear guidelines have to be made and 
followed to ensure that pursuit of mandate is primal. The following is a brief analysis 
of the CGIAR policy on IP.  
 
The CGIAR 
 
The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR or CG) is a 
strategic alliance of countries, international and regional organizations, and private 
foundations supporting 15 international agricultural Centres. These CG Centres work 
with national agricultural research systems and civil society organizations including 
the private sector. The CGIAR’s mission is “to achieve sustainable food security and 
reduce poverty in developing countries through scientific research and research-
related activities in the fields of agriculture, forestry, fisheries, policy, and 
environment.”31 The CGIAR expressly states that it “generates global public goods 
that are available to all.” 
 
The CGIAR and Intellectual Property 
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is an international, legally binding 
framework for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. Given its pivotal 
position, it has a direct bearing on all institutions in the field of conservation including 
the CGIAR. The CBD has three main objectives: the conservation of biological 
diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of 
the benefits arising from such use.32 The CBD was the first global agreement to cover 
all aspects of biological diversity: genetic resources, species and ecosystems and also 
the first to recognize that the conservation of biological diversity is integral part of 
sustainable development. 
 
Material held by the CG Centres falls broadly under two categories: the Ex situ 
germplasm collection held in trust otherwise known as designated germplasm; and 
breeding material developed by the individual Centres. Ex situ collections fall into 
two categories, those that were collected after the 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) came into force and are therefore covered by the CBD, and those 
that were collected prior to the CBD entry into force whose legal status has been 
subject to much debate. Generally, distribution of the Ex situ material is governed by 
the 1994 Agreement between the Centres and the FAO which placed all the 
collections of plant germplasm collected before the CBD came into force under the 
auspices of FAO. The distribution of breeding material developed by individual 
                                                 
30 See N Louwaars et al., Impacts of Strengthened Intellectual Property Rights Regimes on the Plant 
Breeding Industry in Developing Countries (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2005). for a 
more thorough discussion of these. 
31 see the CGIAR website http://www.cgiar.org/who/index.html last accessed 18 Aug 2006 
32 Convention on Biological Diversity, (1992), 31 ILM 818, available at 
http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp 
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centres is governed by the CGIAR Guiding Principles and Material Transfer 
Agreements (MTAs).  
 
IP policy in the CGIAR system 
 
The CG contemplated developing working principles on IP as early as 1991. These 
have had to be continually reviewed owing to a number of factors. To begin with, the 
CBD came into force in 1993 with great implications for access to genetic resources. 
In addition, the Centres entered into an agreement with FAO in 1994 bringing their 
germplasm collection under the international network of ex situ collections. Further, 
WTO Multilateral Trade Agreement under which the Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPs) falls came into force in 1995. TRIPs obliges all WTO 
member countries to enact and enforce legislation governing intellectual property. All 
CGIAR member countries are members of the WTO and virtually all countries within 
which the CGIAR operates are WTO members.   
 
A panel on IPRs was set up in 1994 whose report included recommendations on IP 
management by Centres. The Guiding Principles on IP and Genetic Resources 
emanated from these recommendations. The Guiding Principles address various issues 
such as sovereignty, farmers’ rights, biosafety and IP protection.33  
 
IP on Designated Germplasm and Centre Bred Material 
 
It is well known that the vast majority of germplasm held in the CG was collected 
from countries in the South. There has been considerable debate over the status of this 
genetic material, to whom the CG is accountable and whether or not it is subject to IP 
protection. The status of germplasm collected before the CBD came into force was an 
outstanding issue to be resolved through the FAO.34 After years of negotiations, the 
FAO Conference adopted the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for 
Food and Agriculture (the ITPGR), in November 2001.35 This legally-binding Treaty 
differs substantially from its predecessor, the non-binding International Undertaking 
for Plant Genetic Resources. The ITPGR finally addresses ex-situ collections 
collected before the CBD came into force.36  
 
Some of the core issues on IP policy in the CG include one, whether the CG Centres 
can seek IP protection for research products from both designated germplasm and for 
centre bred material; whether they should; whether the CG Centres have the authority 
to allow third parties to seek protection for research products from both designated 
germplasm and centre bred material; and whether they should allow this. These 
questions are addressed below.  
 
 
                                                 
33 CGIAR, The Guiding Principles on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources available at 
www.cgiar.org  
34 See S Bragdon and D  Downes, 'Recent Policy Trends and Developments Related to the 
Conservation, Use and Development of Genetic Resources ', Issues in Genetic Resources No. 7 (Rome: 
IPGRI, 1998 ).  
35 through Resolution 3/2001 
36 Art 15 of the ITPGR available at www.fao.org  
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Can third parties seek IP protection for research products from designated 
germplasm and centre bred material? 
 
Under the CG Guiding Principles, designated germplasm is not subject to IP 
protection or legal claim by Centres or other recipients. The FAO-CG Centres’ 
Agreement categorically states that the ‘Centre shall not claim legal ownership over 
the designated germplasm, nor shall it seek any intellectual property rights over that 
germplasm or related information.’37 This was further reaffirmed by the Centre 
Directors in the CDC Statement on the Guiding Principles on IPRs relating to Genetic 
Resources.  
 
Designated germplasm or Centre bred material can be used by recipients for breeding 
purposes, research and training. The recipients include the private sector. The 
recipients may seek protection for the resulting products of breeding through UPOV 
or other sui generis systems. The recipients cannot preclude others from using the 
original material. Unlike patenting which requires Centre approval, third parties do 
not need Centre permission to seek PBRs on research products from designated 
germplasm or centre bred material. The Guiding Principles fail to address this.  
 
Do CG Centres have the authority to allow third parties to seek IP protection for 
research products from designated germplasm and centre bred material? 
 
There has been considerable debate by scholars on the question of the Centres’ 
authority to permit third parties to exploit genetic resources held in trust. Designated 
germplasm is generally considered to be held in trust by the CG Centres.38 Under the 
trustee principle, a trustee’s duty is to keep control of and preserve trust property. One 
of the issues arising from this is whether a CG Centre can permit a third party to 
secure IP rights over germplasm held in trust.39 This question does not seem to have 
been answered directly by the CGIAR at the policy level although it can be argued 
that if the ultimate end of allowing third parties to seek IP protection for research 
products from designated germplasm and centre bred material is to benefit the poor, 
and facilitate the CG Centre fulfil its mandate, then it would appear that the CG 
Centre would be acting within its trustee obligations. As the various policy documents 
currently stand, this issue of trusteeship does not seem to be appreciated thereby 
allowing for the IP protection of material by third parties for their own commercial 
interests. 
 
Can CG Centres seek IP protection for research products from designated germplasm 
and centre bred material? 
 
As per the terms of the CG IP policy and MTA, Centres can only seek IP protection 
where either, protection is needed to facilitate technology transfer, or protection is 
otherwise needed to protect the interests of developing nations. A template for IP 
                                                 
37 Article 3(b) 
38 See http://www.cgiar.org/corecollection/docs/cg8810g.pdf under the heading ‘ownership’ which 
states that ‘collections assembled as a result of international collaboration should not become the 
property of any single nation, but should be held in trust for the use of present and future generations of 
research workers in all countries throughout the world.’  
39 See Blakeney supra note 22 for a more thorough discussion of the trustee principle and the problems 
raised. 
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Policy statements recently approved by the CG Committee on Genetic Resources 
Policy places emphasis on the Centres’ need for full disclosure into the public 
domain, sharing of materials, data and information generated by Centres. It exhorts 
that Centres should hold as their basic IP Policy the pursuit of publication and should 
only seek IP Protection when necessary to serve the poor. The template list situations 
where this may be acceptable as: 
 
“ i. To engage in public and private partnerships which pursue 
mission-based research; 
ii. to ensure ready access; 
iii. to avoid possible restrictions arising from “blocking” 
patents and to ensure Centre’s ability to pursue its research 
without undue hindrance; 
iv. to ensure the effective transfer of technology, research 
products and other benefits to the resource poor. 
 
The Centre will disclose the reasons for seeking protection” 
 
Although the template is not intended to replace the IP policy statements or the 
MTAs, it is important in that it clarifies statements in the previous documents and is 
intended to ensure that individual Centres’ statements address all the relevant issues 
“in a consistent and harmonious manner.”  
 
The policy and MTAs emphasise that IP protection should not be seen as a means for 
securing financial returns although in some cases the reality is that IP protection may 
be a source of operating funds.  
 
Cells, organelles, genes and molecular constructs can be patented, even those isolated 
from designated germplasm. Permission from the relevant Centre has to be sought 
however, and this will be given only after consultation with countries of origin of the 
relevant germplasm (where this is known or can be readily identified). This is in 
accordance with the requirements of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).  
 
Should CG Centres seek IP protection for research products from designated 
germplasm and centre bred material? 
 
An instance where protection may be sought is if it helps promote collaborative 
partnerships which speed up the development of new products and services and 
facilitates their deployment to the end users – the poor farmers in developing 
countries. CG Centres may enter into agreement with right holders of protected 
material but only to facilitate access and availability of the material to developing 
nations and only when the benefits of such collaboration outweigh the potential 
disadvantages. In all cases, the requirements mentioned above must be met.  
 
In deciding whether or not to seek IP protection, CG Centres must consider the 
transaction cost and the incident management burden.40 Even though monetary gains 
                                                 
40 Maredia & Erbisch discuss some of the issues that public research institutes have to consider and 
summarise them as: what type of IP should be sought?  How should the institute use its protected 
technology – should it license it to others to generate income, license it to others royalty free, or use it 
as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the private sector? In the case of patenting, and where the 
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by themselves should not determine the decision of the CG Centres whether or not to 
protect a technology, they are nonetheless important and have to be considered in the 
decision making process.  
 
The Centre Directors’ Committee Statement to MTM 1998 on Genetic Resources, 
Biotechnology and Proprietary Science, identified areas that need further clarification. 
Among these was the issue of benefit sharing for IPRs on Centre bred material and 
whether and when to allow for IP protection on Centre-bred material where there was 
no significant input by the recipient or when more than one recipient in a country 
requests permission to apply for IPRs.41 
 
 
III CONCLUSION 
 
The characteristics of goods determine which sector should provide them. 
‘Publicness’ and ‘privateness’ are often not innate properties – goods move along the 
public good – private good continuum. Agricultural research is an impure public good 
and its provision requires a multiple of authorities and actors, as do most mixed 
goods. Given the fact that it is of vital social value, and the increasing inequalities in 
resource allocation owing mainly to globalisation, government intervention in the 
provision of agricultural research products (read food) is crucial. 
 
IPRs introduce excludability to pure public goods. There is an inherent theoretical 
conflict in the application of IPRs to public goods. Public research organisations are 
increasingly finding themselves in situations where they have to protect their research 
products through IPRs or where they use products protected by third parties. As such, 
public research organisations need to creatively formulate clear IP and incident 
guidelines and ensure these are followed in order to ascertain the pursuit of their 
ultimate objective – the provision of research products that are equally available and 
accessible to all. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
technology is protected by third parties, a public research institute has to decide whether it should 
license the technology or invent around it; and should it negotiate a license with a third party right 
holder, what terms and conditions it should ensure are included to allow for its freedom to operate. See 
K  Maredia and F Erbisch, 'Capacity Building in Intellectual Property Management in Agricultural 
Biotechnology', in F  Erbisch and K Maredia (eds.), Intellectual Property Rights in Agricultural 
Biotechnology (Oxon: CABI Publishing, 1998). 
41 See Susan Bragdon, 'Recent Intellectual Property Rights Controversies and Issues at the Cgiar', in V 
Santaniello et al. (eds.), Agriculture and Intellectual Property Rights: Economic, Institutional and 
Implementation Issues in Biotechnology. (Oxon: CABI Publishing, 2000). for a more thorough 
discussion on the outstanding issues. 
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